research-log
Certificate of Authenticity Tampering in Aerospace 3PL Chain: Recreation of a Real Provenance Spoof, Simulated for Public Disclosure
Project Code: SAF-2874
Type: Secure Supply Chain Mechanism Audit
In Q3 2024, BrewHaul USA was engaged by a Tier 1 aerospace supplier to simulate and document a provenance spoof against a blockchain-backed smart contract system used for validating Certificates of Authenticity (CoAs) for high-integrity titanium assemblies. The goal: to stress-test the robustness of on-chain materials validation mechanisms when faced with spoofed uploads and confirmed supplier-side forgery.
This simulation emulated a real failure mode previously observed in the Aeroforge-Boeing logistics chain and exposed key flaws in trust enforcement at both the API and contract level. All identifiers and transactional metadata were randomized for safe disclosure. The result is a clean-room reproduction suitable for public learning.
Exploit Design: Spoofing the Certificate of Authenticity
We deployed the smart contract (VulnProvenance.sol), modeled after a simplified version of Boeing_CoA_Registry, reproducing the logic flaw found in the original production code. The contract permitted unrestricted submission of CoA hashes tied to physical component batches, without verifying the legitimacy of the sender, the authority of the issuer, or the integrity of the referenced token. A minimal proof-of-concept is shown below:
function addCertificate(uint256 tokenId, bytes32 coahash) public {
certificates[tokenId] = coahash;
}This construct enables any party to spoof a CoA by overwriting existing hashes or inserting fraudulent ones. In Boeing's trust-assumed integration pipeline, this flaw silently poisoned the digital provenance record without alerting operators or triggering compliance alarms.
The attack is low-effort, invisible on-chain without additional auditing layers, and bypasses most naive access control models. Our audit reaffirms the need for cryptographically enforced trust boundaries and robust validation logic at both input and update layers.
Technical Artifacts
- attack-overview.md: Red team report on spoof injection, will upload when cleared for public disclosure.
- patch-notes.md: Hardened contract changes and logic gates
- threat-model.md: STRIDE-based security review
- VulnProvenance.sol: Source code for simulation
- 📘 README.md: Full SDLC and artifact index
All artifacts are available in the GitHub repository .